This study examines whether task-specific jobs are rewarded differently across establishments of different sizes and whether these rewards vary across distinct technologies. We found that the aggregate premium estimates on the impact of size on wages conceal significant differences between tasks and technologies and that these differences reflect unobserved individual heterogeneity. The role of self-selection of more productive workers into larger establishments is particularly substantial in the case of abstract tasks.
1. Introduction Moore's (1911) seminal study on the impact of firm size on wages indicates that the condition of the laborer improves in numerous ways as the size of the establishment increases. Since Moore's research, the firm-size wage effect has been detected in a number of countries with differing labor market institutions. As Oi and Idson (1999, p. 2207) conclude, this phenomenon has not changed a century later. According to their study, "a worker who holds a job in a large firm is paid a higher wage, receives more generous fringe benefits, gets more training, and is provided with a cleaner, safer, and generally more pleasant work environment." The wage differential between small and large establishments appears to be substantial and pervasive. 1 The present study explores the firm size-wage relation using data from a period that predates the era of Moore's original study. Accordingly, the paper has both value and interest. The novelty of the study, however, builds on two general aspects. First, we connect the analysis to the contemporary debate regarding the polarizing impacts of technological changes on wages.
The polarization theory categorizes jobs as routine or non-routine tasks and argues that technological advances lead to an increase in the demand for jobs, with non-routine tasks at the expense of jobs with routine tasks. 2 We follow this line of thought and ask whether similar argumentation applies to establishment size; i.e., are tasks at both ends of the wage distribution better rewarded in large firms than in small firms? Second, we investigate whether the impact of establishment size on task-specific wages is technology specific. Contract data from the maritime industry spanning the period 1860-1914 provide an ideal case for our purposes because the industry uses two distinct technologies: vessels that are powered by either sail or steam. 
Data and results
The data used in this study are compiled from the seamen's house recruitment records. 3 We utilize contract documents that were collected from six major port towns in Sweden and that span from the 1860s to the early 1910s. We focus on five occupations that are labeled into the following three groups: highskilled/high-wage mates and engineers engaging in abstract tasks, intermediate skilled/middlewage able-bodied seamen performing routine tasks, and unskilled/low-wage ordinary seamen and engine room operatives fulfilling manual tasks. The duties of mates included managerial and supervisory tasks, responsibility for the cargo, keeping the logbook, navigational measurements and commanding the round-the-clock watches. Engineers were the key laborers on steam vessels. Their tasks included tending the machinery, ensuring that it was operating properly and undertaking repairs. Able-bodied seamen occupied routine tasks, such as handling the ropes to achieve the desired positions of the masts, spars and sails on sailing vessels.
Ordinary seamen were sailors with limited amounts of experience who performed manual tasks.
The engine room operatives consisted of the trimmers who carried the coal from the storage areas to the boiler areas and the firemen who shoveled coal into the boilers to generate steam.
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Simple descriptions from the data show that larger vessels pay higher wages (Data Appendix).
In this study, we measure establishment size by the gross capacity of the vessel instead of the number of employees per vessel because the contract data do not provide an exact identifier for vessels. For abstract tasks, the average wages rise steadily with the establishment size, from 57.9 kronas in the first quarter to 77.6 kronas in the fourth quarter, indicating an increase of 34 percent. For routine tasks, the pattern is moderate, and wages increase by 13 percent. For manual tasks, the size-wage profile is, in effect, flat with a small decline in the third quarter.
The numbers also show that both the average age and the share of married mariners decrease with the vessel size. The age-vessel size profile is rather even, whereas the share of married mariners declines from 30 percent in the smallest vessels to 18 percent in the largest vessels.
The relationship between technology and vessel size, in turn, is U-shaped. Steam-operated vessels are common amongst the largest vessels (30 percent of the total) and the smallest vessels (20 percent of the total). Table 1 percent for both technologies. These preliminary findings are intuitively appealing. The tasks of mates may be more demanding in larger vessels than in small vessels, and thus the workers on these vessels are more highly compensated. Alternatively, premiums may reflect profit sharing related to the higher productivity of larger vessels. The estimates are smaller for routine and manual tasks and differ across technology: for vessels powered by sail, the premiums are 2-3 percent, whereas for those powered by steam, the premiums are effectively zero. Observed technology differences may be caused by various factors. For example, monitoring costs or efficiency wage considerations may be more size-related for sail-operated vessels than for steam-operated vessels.
One obvious explanation for wage premiums, namely the selection of workers into differently sized vessels, is examined in this study using individual fixed effects (FE). 5 In particular, the results of Table 3 ease our assessment of the possible sources of size premiums for abstract tasks; that is, the premiums vanish when we account for unobserved individual heterogeneity.
This finding applies to both technologies and suggests that larger vessels attract more productive individuals. The FE results for other task groups are alike, with the estimates statistically insignificant in all cases. Thus, our findings challenge the general view on the universal nature of employer-size wage premiums.
Conclusions
The study examines whether task-specific jobs are rewarded differently across establishments of different sizes and whether these rewards vary across distinct technologies. Our findings were as follows: (i) the capacity measure of establishment size produces results that are comparable to studies that quantify establishment size by the number of employees, (ii) aggregate OLS estimates conceal significant differences between tasks and technologies on the impact of establishment size on wages, (iii) differences in task-and technology-specific wage premiums reflect unobserved individual heterogeneity, and (iv) the role of self-selection of more productive workers toward larger vessels is particularly substantial in the case of abstract tasks. 
